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Introduction
It was Jacob Schmookler who first drew attention to the 
distinction between an invention and a sub invention 
when exploring the process of technological change. Sub 
invention, he argued, was an ‘obvious change in a prod-
uct or process’ resulting from the application of engineer-
ing knowledge and/or acts of skill, and this included the 
notion of ‘routine innovation’, previously described by 
Merrill as a modification that a ‘skilled practitioner’ would 
be expected to make in a product or process to adapt it to 
suit minor changes (Schmookler 1966, 6). Burt described 
these processes in the early 1990s, specifically in relation 
to non-ferrous mining, as the ‘straightforward applica-
tion of engineering knowledge and or acts of skill by the 
workforce’, and he used the idea, in part, to challenge the 
traditional view that the Germans established world leader-
ship in the mining and metallurgical arts and subsequently 
brought their knowledge to Britain (Burt 1991, 251–254).
Rather than engaging with the question of who pio-
neered British non-ferrous metal mining (the focus on 
German engineers in this instance is purely coincidental), 
this study examines the process of sub invention or routine 
innovation as a strategy for economic survival at Tyndrum 
lead mine in the mid nineteenth century. Whilst the applica-
tion of key inventions to rock removal, blasting, haulage 
and pumping ushered in the era of deep mining, it was often 
small adjustments and modifications to existing equip-
ment and infrastructure that enabled mining companies 
to gain further economies in extraction. The fickle nature 
of lead ore deposits and a volatile mining market created 
a dynamic industry responsive to change and well versed 
in technological adaptions to either produce more for less 
money, or work associated minerals that could be raised and 
marketed at a profit. The story of Tyndrum is not a new 
one, but the abundance of surviving documentary evidence 
opens a wider window onto both the process of adaptive 
strategies and sub invention at a mining operation nearing 
the end of financially viable extraction and processing; and 
it captures the futility of economic resilience in working a 
finite resource.
Although Scotland was not a major contributor to the 
total national output, lead ore was mined in the majority 
of the Scottish shires (Wilson 1921, 2); yet research on the 
industry located north of the border compared to that in 
England and Wales has been sparse. Burt, in his study of the 
British lead mining industry, only makes fleeting references 
to Scotland (Burt 1984). Smout offers a single but detailed 
chapter on the economic context, and Harvey has explored 
aspects of the social history of the ventures at Leadhills and 
Wanlockhead in the Southern Uplands (Smout 1967, 103–
135; Harvey 1972, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1999). Callender 
and Macaulay have focused on the metal mines of Islay 
(Callender & Macaulay 1984). More recently Callender, 
together with Reeson, has examined the Scottish gold rush 
at Kildonan in the 1860s, largely from an archaeological 
perspective (Callender & Reeson 2007). There are also sev-
eral short studies on the mines of the Ochils, Tomnadashan 
on south Loch Tayside, and Galloway (Bainbridge 1980; 
Dickie & Forster 1974; Devéria 2001; Cressey et al. 2004; 
Moreton 2008). The mine site at Tyndrum has primarily 
attracted the interest of environmental and geo-scientists 
(MacKenzie & Pulford 2002; Farmer et al. 1997). More 
recently Mills, Simpson and Adderley have attempted to 
link current pollution levels at the site to historic mining 
practices (Mills et al. 2014). This study expands both the 
burgeoning Scottish narrative and the specific history of 
mining at Tyndrum from a technological perspective.
Tyndrum lead mine and 
the second Marquis of Breadalbane
The mine is located in the Loch Lomond and Trossachs 
National Park at the western fringes of Tyndrum (see Fig. 1), 
in the north-west of the historic Campbell family estate of 
Breadalbane in the southern Scottish highlands. It is situ-
ated south of the A 82 Glasgow to Fort William road on the 
northern flanks of Sròn nan Colan, commonly known as 
Minehill. The mine was one of Scotland’s largest producers 
of ore after Leadhills (Smout), and has a two hundred year 
documented history of intermittent operation (see Table 1). 
The lease of the mineral rights in the early eighteenth cen-
tury was part of wider commercialisation of the estate fol-
lowing the Act of Union in 1707 (MacInnes 1998, 177–201, 
Technological Innovation and Adaption: Tyndrum Lead  
Mine and the German Managers, 1838 to 1865
Catherine Mills
Abstract: In 1838 the second Marquis of Breadalbane, having failed to lease the mineral 
rights at Tyndrum lead mine on the Campbell family estate in the southern Scottish highlands, 
made a decision to work the mine himself. When he began his operation, the mine was nearing 
exhaustion and what little productivity remained was hindered by increasingly complex 
mineralisation. The Marquis, however, was convinced that the mine could still produce great 
wealth; he looked to Germany for expertise and employed a succession of German mining 
engineers to manage his ailing operation. The survival of their monthly progress reports and 
other documentation offers a unique perspective on the Scottish lead mining industry and 
the adaptive strategies, in terms of technological innovation and mining practices, that the 
Germans employed to prolong the venture’s economic survival.
52
Welsh Mines and Mining No. 4 Mining Technology
191). Although there is some indication that the lead had 
been worked in the vicinity of Tyndrum in the fifteenth cen-
tury (OSA 1791–99, Parish of Glenurchy and Inishail, 35), 
it is Sir Robert Clifton who is credited with the discovery 
of the ore in 1735.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the remote and 
isolated location of the mine (Fig. 1) hindered the transpor-
tation of both lead (ore and bar) to market and coal (for fuel) 
and materials into the site. The route involved carriage by 
packhorse to the head of Loch Lomond, a distance of around 
18 kilometres, and then by boat to the river Clyde. Not only 
was this expensive, but in the late 1830s it took five weeks 
from purchase to get material delivered from Glasgow 
(NRS, GD112/18/8/7/14). The final company to work the 
mineral lease, the Tyndrum Lead and Zinc Company (see 
Table 1), was the only venture to be able to take advantage 
of the Callender to Oban Railway for transportation, which 
reached Tyndrum in 1873, but by then the quality and quan-
tity of the ore had dwindled and the company primarily re-
worked the dumps. As a consequence the mine was heavily 
reliant on water power and the vagaries of the weather for 
most of its history. The water supply was either frozen in 
winter or in flood or dry during the remaining months. This, 
coupled with miners’ need to cut peat for fuel, both for the 
mine and domestic use, together with hay for winter fodder, 
produced a marked seasonal pattern of working. The site of 
the mine also posed difficulties (Fig. 2). It was at high alti-
tude, the entrance to the upper workings being at 500 metres 
above sea level, and Minehill was steep sided, averaging an 
incline of around 1 in 4. Mine labour was housed in cottages 
on the western fringe of the village of Tyndrum. These were 
built in the 1730s under the terms of Clifton’s original lease. 
The miners were largely inexperienced and recruited locally 
from within the Breadalbane estate.
This study focuses on the period 1838 to 1865 when 
the landowner, John Campbell, the second Marquis of 
Breadalbane, essentially worked his own mineral lease 
primarily under the management of German engineers. 
The Marquis took an interest in science and technology 
and was a keen amateur geologist (Easson 2011, 63). He 
frequently roamed the hills between Taymouth Castle and 
Tyndrum in the company of his dogs, searching for min-
erals with a leather bag and a geologist’s hammer (Gillies 
1980, 212). His personal collection of minerals was exhib-
ited at Crystal Palace in 1851. The Marquis also believed 
somewhat erroneously that the estate would produce great 
mineral wealth (Robertson 1992, 189–217, 192). Aside 
from Tyndrum mine, mineral deposits had been located at 
Lochearnhead and immediately south of Loch Tay at Corrie 
Buie, Ardtalnaig, and Tomnadashan, which was worked for 
copper pyrites. There were sufficient small-scale discover-
ies throughout the adult life of the Marquis to reinforce his 
belief that the Breadalbane estate would eventually yield 
rich deposits; examples of such discoveries were a small 
nugget of gold at Lochearnhead in 1855 and the small silver 
yield at Tyndrum (NRS, GD112/18/8/16/1; also see Table 
2 below).
In spite of a nationwide advertising campaign in the early 
nineteenth century the Marquis failed to attract any interest 
in the mineral rights to the estate (NRS, GD112/18/9/8/33), 
and in 1838 he decided to work the lease himself. The 
Marquis employed George Baron to manage what was 
essentially an ailing venture at Tyndrum. Baron had previ-
ously worked at the Strontian lead mines and brought with 
him experienced miners (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/2).
The landowner employing a salaried manager, with 
varying degrees of autonomy, appears typical of the 
Scottish metal mining sector. For example, John Erskine 
primarily directed his silver mining venture at Alva, in 
Clackmannanshire, leaving his wife Catherine in charge Fig. 1 Tyndrum location
Table 1 Timeline: Tyndrum mine
Year Lease holder Production
annual 
average 
(tons)
1730 Sir Robert Clifton 424
1745 English Company of Mine Adventurers 136
1760 Rippon Company 165
1762 Paton and Richardson 157
1768 Scots Mining Company 153
1791 abandonment 0
1838 second Marquis of Breadalbane 25
1865 abandonment
Tyndrum Mining Company
0
0
1916 Tyndrum Lead and Zinc Company 27.5
1928 abandonment 0
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of operations whilst he was raising guns and gold for the 
Jacobite cause and later in exile (Moreton 2008). In the case 
of Tyndrum, the Marquis vigorously directed his managers, 
either himself – when he was resident at Taymouth Castle 
at Kenmore, some 57 kilometres from Tyndrum – or via his 
factor, John Wyllie, whilst he was resident in London.
The Marquis demanded a detailed monthly account of 
his managers’ activities, and in turn they requested weekly 
reports from the overseers, who primarily managed the 
Marquis’ peripheral ventures. These reports together with 
correspondence and other documentation, such as the fac-
tor’s business notes and records of the miners’ bargains, 
have all survived and are archived at the National Records 
of Scotland in Edinburgh (NRS, Breadalbane Muniments, 
GS112/). Unfortunately the archive contains few copy 
letters from the Marquis and, whilst the mine manag-
ers recorded expenses, full financial details are sporadic. 
Nonetheless the surviving documentation, together with 
substantial archaeological surface remains at the site, opens 
a window onto Scottish metal mining history, the daily 
operation of the mine, social conditions, labour relations 
and, specifically in relation to this study, mining practice 
and technology.
Whilst the Marquis employed the German mining engi-
neers specifically for their expertise, he would only heed 
their advice if it suited him. For example, he would often 
send the same mineral sample for assay several times until 
he got the results he wanted and between 1837 and 1856 
he spent £42,457 primarily on the assaying of minerals 
from his estate, trials, independent surveys and continued 
exploratory work at Tyndrum (NRS, GD112/18/1/8/4). He 
eventually had a laboratory installed at Taymouth Castle 
to assay minerals himself (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/7). The 
Marquis would also interfere, either directly or via John 
Wyllie, with the management of the workforce. For exam-
ple, Wyllie determined which tenants were employed at the 
mine, and the Marquis himself cut the pay of miner John 
Forbes for requesting a pay rise (NRS, GD112/18/9/8/37–
8). The records suggest that the Marquis was not an easy 
man to work for.
Aside from the innate difficulties of a remote location, 
when the Marquis began his operation, the workings at 
Tyndrum had been abandoned for over thirty years and the 
mine was nearing exhaustion. The increasing complexity 
of the mineralisation made it difficult to extract the lead 
ore from the country rock and associated gangue ores. In 
particular zinc, galena and blende occurred in equal pro-
portions, and occurred as small single crystals dispersed 
in quartz (Wilson 1921, 95). In addition, as Odernheimer, 
the first German to arrive at Tyndrum, described, the quartz 
was ‘too hard and the ore too soft’ to separate efficiently 
(NRS, GD112//18/8/7/25). The Scots Mining Company had 
astutely pulled out at the end of the eighteenth century when 
their lease had expired.
The Marquis began his venture by replacing the surface 
infrastructure at Tyndrum without first having proven the 
Fig. 2 Tyndrum mine today: the upper workings of Tyndrum showing the open cut and the remains of two dressing shelters constructed 
during Clifton’s original lease (to left of centre)
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ground. He had a water powered crushing mill with adja-
cent sheds for bruising and washing the ore constructed 
at Glengarry some 1.5 kilometres east of the mine site, 
together with a stone lined leat to supply water from the 
Crom Allt, taken from just east of the mine site. He also 
had a new waggon way laid from the base of Minehill to 
Glengarry linked to the main levels at the mine site via 
an inclined plane (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/2). There were no 
arrangements for primary separation of the lead ore from 
waste rock or gangue metals at the mine. If the rock was 
of mixed mineral content it was either dumped in situ at 
the surface of the mine or carried by the waggon way to 
Glengarry. Plans were also drawn up to erect a smelter 
adjacent to the crusher. Baron certainly implied that the 
walls were subsequently constructed by stating that the roof 
would be prepared as soon as the chimney was built (NRS, 
GD112/18/8/7/2). In the interim ore was sent for smelt-
ing to Alloa in Clackmannanshire and also to north Wales, 
but primarily to Glasgow (NRS, GD112/18/8/1/6 and 10). 
Previously both Clifton and the Scots Mining Company had 
dressed their ore on Minehill and smelted around 3 kilo-
metres downstream from the mine at the confluence of the 
Crom Allt and the river Cononish at Dalrigh (see Fig. 3). The 
ambition of the Marquis’ plans is indicated by the proposals 
to construct a canal linking the Clyde with the southern end 
of Loch Lomond and the northern end with Loch Tay, pro-
viding a through route to Kenmore at an estimated cost of 
between £40,000 and £50,000. The ore from Tyndrum was 
cited as a key source of revenue (Lindsay 1968, 183–184). 
Only a short section (around half a kilometre) of the canal 
at the northern end of Loch Lomond was built, with turning 
space and landing stage.
How much Baron was responsible for suggesting the 
introduction of the improvements at the mine is not clear 
from the record; neither is the total sum of the initial outlay. 
Robertson has estimated that just under £8,000 was spent 
between 1838 and 1839 (Robertson 1992, 192). This invest-
ment is significant to the story of the venture as it set the 
scene for the next twenty years. The Marquis placed an ever 
increasing emphasis on recouping the investment.
Four levels, Long, McDougall’s, Bryan’s and New, were 
allegedly being worked (NRS, GD112/18/8/7) out of a total 
of nine, and in January 1839 Baron assured the Marquis 
‘that considerable profit will arise from the mining opera-
tions of the past year’ (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/3). Baron did 
not wait to find out. He suddenly decided to leave and take 
his family out of the country. Whether or not Baron fore-
saw the financial difficulties is not made clear in the record. 
There was no compensating income recorded at the mine 
during his period of management (Robertson 1992, 192). 
Fig. 3 Site locations
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There had, however, also been problems with the Strontian 
miners over their bargains, which is also revealing. The 
men wanted payment by the fathom and not ‘under any 
consideration’ by the quality of the ore. These were experi-
enced miners who would have had some knowledge of the 
viability of the operation; they were clearly not willing to 
share the risk (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/2).
Baron’s son Edward, who was currently engaged at 
Leadhills, offered his services to the Marquis upon his 
father’s departure, but he was perceived as too young to 
take on the responsibility of managing the operation (NRS, 
GD112/18/8/7/3). It is at this point in the history of Tyndrum 
that the German engineers, Odernheimer, Reichendorf and 
Thost, entered the picture.
German management at Tyndrum
Odernheimer, the first German engineer, arrived at 
Tyndrum shortly after Baron’s departure early in 1839 and 
remained until 1841. Odernheimer was accompanied by a 
colleague named Horstmann and a ‘practical miner’ known 
as Laubach who would teach the Tyndrum men mining 
skills (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/10). Neither professional nor 
personal details are recorded for any of the three men. For 
example, Odernheimer’s qualifications, his experience and 
how he was recruited are not known; neither are first names 
recorded. Odernheimer’s salary perhaps gives an indication 
of his expertise. He was paid £200 in the first year; this was 
increased to £250 in the second year, and from year three he 
would receive a percentage of all profits (Bainbridge 1980, 
40).
Stephen Reichendorf replaced Odernheimer in 1847. 
Reichendorf had studied at the University of Heidelberg, 
had a background in both metal and coal mining and had 
previously worked in Austria, India and eastern Europe. He 
had met the Marquis in Paris and was persuaded to take 
up the position at Tyndrum by the Marquis’ enthusiasm 
for the mine’s alleged mineral potential and his prom-
ises that Tyndrum was ‘a very cheap place to live’ (NRS, 
GD112/18/9/5/25). Reichendorf’s stay in Scotland was 
short; he left for Valencia after three months.
Gustav Thost followed some two years later in 1849 and 
he remained until around 1859. Thost was a colleague of 
Odernheimer, had studied in his home town of Freiburg 
and had previous experience both in Saxony and Spain. He 
was essentially a fugitive from his homeland, having ‘taken 
the side of the Constitution of the Parliament of Frankfurt’ 
during the constitutional revolutions in Europe in 1848–
49 (NRS, GD112/18/9/7/14). Shortly after his arrival in 
Scotland his property in Freiburg was confiscated and he 
elicited the support of Campbell in ensuring his family’s 
safe passage to Scotland (NRS, GD112/18/8/10/8).
The Germans found highland Scotland and conditions 
at the mine very different from their homelands, and there 
are many statements that ‘it is not the German way’. These 
appear to refer to three key elements: good diet and hous-
ing and strict discipline to maximise labour efficiency. 
Odernheimer described his style of management in relation 
to the workforce as ‘an almost religious point’, ‘to take care 
of the workmen’, ‘to be kind to them’, ‘it’s worthwhile’, he 
claimed, ‘they return plentifully’ (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/9).
Reichendorf in particular could not bear the solitude, the 
weather, the conditions and what he perceived as undue 
interference from the Marquis’ factor. He resided at the 
Tyndrum Inn, where he described the walls as black with 
wet; at one point he asked for Mr Wyllie to be removed 
from his post (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/1–25). Reichendorf 
struggled with poor industrial relations and the lack of 
capital investment. All three managers found the pressure 
exerted by the Marquis to produce and process ore at mini-
mum costs frustrating.
The Marquis wanted a return on his initial investment 
and as long as production remained at a low level he was 
reluctant to invest any further capital, yet at the same time 
he was keen to keep the mine working in the hope of an 
eventual bonanza. All Tyndrum’s mine managers were 
caught between a rock and a hard place and their work-
ing lives became increasingly difficult as time progressed 
and production continued to dwindle. Odernheimer’s, 
Reichendorf’s and Thost’s responses to the Marquis’ 
demands were two-fold: increase labour efficiency and 
adapt and modify existing technology to increase produc-
tion. Whilst this study touches upon the management of the 
labour force, particularly in relation to Thost’s administra-
tion, the following sections concentrate on the key techno-
logical responses, particularly at the surface of the mine; 
this is followed by discussion of how successful the modi-
fications and adaptions were in terms of the economic sur-
vival of the mine.
Adaptive strategies
Odernheimer
When Odernheimer first arrived at the mine he commented 
that the ‘last year of work’, under Baron’s management, 
‘was only to clear out old levels’ and there had been little 
productive work. There were problems with water beneath 
Long Level and the ‘biggest part of the vein was already 
worked out leaving the remaining ore in long strings of no 
great length or depth’. He suggested that continued work 
‘in all levels was worthwhile’ but a ‘good mining operation 
would not be founded on the borders of the old working’; 
he began trials north of the mine (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/9). 
Although details of its commencement are not recorded, a 
new level named after the ‘practical miner’ Laubach appears 
on plans drawn up in 1860 (BGS, 16592, 1860).
Odernheimer emphasised the ‘disorder’ at the mine 
which, he noted, ‘could not be rectified overnight’ (NRS, 
GD112/18/8/7/14). He damned the earlier investment in 
the crusher at Glengarry as ‘fool hardy and premature’ and 
despite the high cost of transporting the ore to Glasgow for 
smelting – estimated at 19 % of the annual cost of running 
the entire operation in 1840 – he brought a halt to the plans 
for a smelter (NRS, GD112/18/9/2/3). This suggests that 
Baron perhaps made a wise decision in quitting his position.
By June Odernheimer was already under pressure, com-
menting that he would not pander to the Marquis’ desire 
for him to promise wealth (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/12). By 
December he was struggling with the attitude of the work-
force, the severity of the weather and economies of scale. 
Tyndrum mine, he grumbled, ‘is to small an operation’ to 
pay (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/17). In response to the mounting 
difficulties Odernheimer began by adapting and extending 
the existing infrastructure at the mine site to both improve 
the efficiency of moving the ore around the steep hillside 
to the waggon way and to tackle the problem of increas-
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ingly complex mineralisation (NRS, GD112/18/4/1/66–67). 
He had rails laid down in the main level (McDougall’s) to 
the surface and had a primary crushing floor constructed 
at the adit mouth with a ‘stampwork and moving hearth’ 
to separate the lead ore from zinc blende and reduce the 
amount of waste rock and gangue minerals transported over 
the 1.5 kilometre distance to the crusher at Glengarry (NRS, 
GD112/18/8/7/15 and GD112/18/9/5/5–6). Shortly before 
his departure he also introduced washing and dressing at the 
entrance to New Level. It took a total of six months to proc-
ess the mixed ore that had been stockpiled at the mouths of 
the adits, which gives an indication of the mineral wealth 
discarded as waste (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/20).
When Odernheimer arrived at Tyndrum there was no 
mechanism in place to transport the ore down the incline 
on the eastern flank of Minehill (marked ‘Breadalbane’s’ 
on Fig. 4) to the waggon way, so to further increase trans-
port efficiency he introduced a self-acting mechanism. This 
was an innovation that he takes credit for introducing into 
Scotland, described as ‘full wagons pulling the empty ones 
to the top’ (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/25). Ore had previously 
been moved around the mine site by use of wheelbarrows 
and ponies down a zig-zag path to the head of the waggon 
way. The embanked route of the ‘Breadalbane’ incline and 
the pony path are both still visible at the site today, together 
with two further higher inclines (marked ‘high incline’ and 
‘middle incline’ on Fig. 4; see also Figs 5 and 6) running 
vertically through the site to the primary dressing floor. 
Unfortunately, no details of these inclines are recorded in 
the documentary evidence. At the Glengarry crusher site 
Odernheimer introduced two ‘German shaking herds’, 
powered by the existing wheel, to tackle what he termed 
the ‘tenace slimes’ in an attempt to extract ever more ore 
from the waste rock (NRS, GD112/8/8/7/2). Every mine, he 
claimed, needed to find its own way of working; this sits 
comfortably with the notion that local conditions determine 
technological adaptions (Burt 1991, 254).
By June 1840 Odernheimer began to suspect his services 
were to be dispensed with, and hoped the Marquis would 
not be offended by his proposal to return to Germany in 
the coming year (NRS, GD112/18/4/1/166). In his request 
to return home, Odernheimer hoped that there would be 
a discovery of new ore, so that he could leave behind a 
‘legacy’ before he left Scotland (NRS, GD112/18/4/1/166). 
Laubach’s Level did not come to fruition. Odernheimer 
missed his homeland, found conditions at the mine and the 
Fig. 4 Incline locations (© John Pickin)
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climate dispiriting – one day of rain, he commented, ‘makes 
the whole place swimming’ (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/12) – and 
he was clearly not envisaging a substantial cut of the prof-
its if he remained for a third year. He departed Scotland 
as planned in 1841 (NRS, GD112/8/4/1/180). During his 
period of management the mine made a total loss of around 
£4,500 (calculated from Robertson’s data: Robertson 1992, 
192).
Crerar and Wilson
The Marquis immediately employed James Crerar, the 
company storekeeper, who was originally from Strontian, 
to manage his venture together with the current overseer at 
Tyndrum, Joseph Wilson. These two continued as manag-
ers until the arrival of Stephen Reichendorf in 1847. Their 
joint reports across the period predictably focus on justify-
ing the increasing cost of the bargains. Although there was 
exploratory work, for example on Ben Odhar, and devel-
opment work in the existing levels, particularly in Stamps 
Level, Crerar and Wilson were fairly gloomy in their over-
all outlook. The explorations were yielding very little and 
they grumbled that the ground was becoming increasingly 
hard; yet these comments were tempered by the occasional 
optimistic comment suggesting potential improvements in 
the quality of ore. But by February 1844 the crushing mill 
was standing idle, the rollers were worn out by the hardness 
of the rock, and later that year the men were back barrowing 
ore round the site (NRS, GD112/18/8/9/1–34).
This period of management is largely superfluous to the 
discussion of technological adaption: Crerar lacked prac-
tical mining experience and neither he nor Wilson held 
the authority to implement changes. Their role was sim-
ply to keep the mine operational. Their story, however, is 
important for historical continuity and for the context of 
Reichendorf’s subsequent difficulties as mine manager. For 
similar reasons Robert Harrison’s period of supervision is 
briefly discussed below in order to show what had been 
happening between Reichendorf’s departure and the arrival 
of Thost.
Reichendorf
Reichendorf’s initial assessment of the mineral wealth at 
Tyndrum was fairly bleak – ‘it is not a rich field’ he com-
mented – but, as with Odernheimer, his brief was to make 
the mine a financial success (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/3). His 
key responses on arrival were again to increase produc-
tion efficiency, particularly in terms of the workforce (NRS, 
GD112/18/9/5/9). He also attempted to tighten up the system 
of accounting, which was integrated with both the company 
store and other operations of the estate. Predictably there 
was tension between Reichendorf, Crerar (who was back 
running the store) and Wilson. Wilson, whom Odernheimer 
had previously described as ‘more blockhead than scoun-
drel’, was dismissed for dishonesty by Reichendorf shortly 
after his arrival. In response, Wilson called his fellow work-
ers to strike and industrial relations at the mine deteriorated.
Reichendorf too was disparaging about the investment in 
the crusher at Glengarry – he referred to it as ‘that expen-
sive mill’ – but bemoaned the fact that there was no smelter; 
to have constructed both, he claimed, would have made for 
a wiser investment (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/7). The desire to 
smelt on site may also reflect the fact that John Wyllie, the 
estate factor, controlled the sale of all processed ore, and 
Reichendorf found it very difficult to establish the profit-
ability of the mine.
In terms of technological adaptions Reichendorf built 
on the existing transport infrastructure initiated under 
Odernheimer’s management and introduced what he termed 
‘wooden canals’. From Reichendorf’s descriptions these 
may have been ore chutes from the upper workings down to 
McDougall’s Level so that ore could be transported by rail 
to the primary crushing floor (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/24). To 
streamline transportation further, he also proposed double 
track or passing places in McDougall’s Level so that empty 
waggons could be ready and waiting to be loaded (NRS, 
GD112/18/9/5/18). In effect he was adapting Odernheimer’s 
original adaptions. Reichendorf’s stay in Scotland was too 
short for his plans to come to fruition and, reflecting the 
poor industrial relations, the wood from the ore chutes was 
Fig. 5 High incline (© John Pickin)
Fig. 6 Middle incline (© John Pickin)
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repeatedly pilfered and used to construct a pig sty at the 
Tyndrum Inn (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/24).
Reichendorf arrived at Tyndrum in June, by July he 
was asking permission of the Marquis to leave, and by 
September he had fled to Valencia indicating that the 
Marquis had reneged on the terms of his contract. In a ten 
page letter addressed to the Marquis, Reichendorf detailed 
accounts of alleged mismanagement and corruption at the 
mine involving Crerar, Wilson and Wyllie.
According to Reichendorf the three men were operating 
the mine to their own advantage rather than in the financial 
interest of the Marquis. They turned a blind eye to the con-
stant pilfering of material from the site, charged wood for 
the church to the mine accounts and, in particular, Crerar 
allowed the men food and whisky from the store irrespec-
tive of their ability to pay or their mounting debts, whilst at 
the same time he exercised very little supervision and the 
men rarely fulfilled their bargains (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/23).
To what extent Reichendorf’s allegations were true is 
difficult to assess. Certainly, when Reichendorf arrived at 
Tyndrum and for the duration of his short stay the Marquis 
was in London, and Wyllie persistently denied Reichendorf 
any direct communication with him. He also undermined 
Reichendorf’s authority by repeatedly removing ‘a quar-
ter’ of the mining labour force to work on the construc-
tion of the canal at the north end of Loch Lomond (NRS, 
GD112/18/9/5/23). There is no copy letter in the archive 
recording the Marquis’ response to Reichendorf’s resigna-
tion letter. Wyllie’s correspondence, in contrast, survives. On 
Reichendorf’s sudden departure he wrote that Reichendorf 
was too young and ‘exceedingly active’. Wyllie intimated 
that he was also overambitious in his aims for the mine and, 
perhaps somewhat hedging his bets, he described Crerar as 
‘addicted to drink’.
Harrison
In the two year interim period between Reichendorf’s res-
ignation and Thost’s appointment the mine was managed 
by Robert Harrison. There is no indication in the records 
of where Harrison was from or his background or previous 
employment. His early reports support the idea that Crerar, 
Wyllie and Wilson had run the mine down. Harrison ordered 
repairs to the railway, the reservoir and the crusher. New 
Level had become ‘impassable’ and ‘bad and dangerous’ 
(NRS, GD112/18/9/6/10/15). It was cleared and retimbered. 
He also reported that the labour force were ‘not disposed to 
work’ and he employed ‘new hands’ both at the surface and 
underground (NRS, GD112/18/9/6/10/13). Crerar was still 
minding the company store and Harrison reports a disagree-
ment over timber in November 1848 between Crerar and 
Griffiths Roberts, the overseer at Tomnadashan mine, the 
Marquis’ copper venture on south Loch Tayside, but other-
wise operations ran smoothly (NRS, GD112/18/9/6/10/19).
Harrison was successful in discovering promising new 
veins in three of the original levels at Tyndrum – Stamps, 
New and McDougall’s – although these were not proven 
long term. Harrison worked with what was on site without 
introducing new technology and infrastructure or adapting 
that which already existed. Although he appears to have 
had more authority than Crerar and Wilson in terms of the 
day to day operation of the mine, the extent of his control 
is unclear. He made no suggestions for change, neither did 
he place any significant financial demands on the Marquis 
other than to request copies of the Mining Journal (NRS, 
GD112/18/9/6/10/21). There were certainly opportunities to 
apply engineering knowledge and skill to increase produc-
tivity. For example, New Level was 100 yards below the top 
of the incline to the waggon way that led to the secondary 
crushing floor at Glengarry. In order to load ore onto the 
waggons it had to be barrowed up a steep slope with a gradi-
ent of around 1 in 6 (NRS, GD112/18/9/7/12).
Nevertheless, Harrison oversaw a successful period at the 
mine with the discovery of new ore, despite the ‘great gloom 
than hung over the lead market’ (NRS, GD112/18/9/6/13) 
and this meant he would have been under less pressure 
to increase efficiency. When Thost was engaged Harrison 
remained employed at Tyndrum, but as the overseer, and he 
was clearly subordinate to Thost. For example, at one point 
he was tasked with locating a bed and fresh linen for Thost 
(NRS, GD112/18/9/7/24).
Thost
Thost had been engaged originally to report on the copper 
mine at Tomnadashan. He had responded to an advertise-
ment placed in the Mining Journal by the Marquis (NRS, 
GD112/18/9/7/14). How and why the transition occurred 
from writing a one off commissioned report to managing 
the Marquis’ entire mining operations is not recorded. Of 
the three Germans it was Thost who remained in post for 
the longest period but, given his fugitive status, he may 
have perceived that he had little choice. He had struggled to 
find work in England and had hoped to go to America (NRS, 
GD112/18/9/7/14).
Thost arrived in Scotland with very limited skills in writ-
ten or spoken English but was fluent within a few months 
and, once he was reunited with his family, he settled com-
fortably into highland life. Although Thost, like his pred-
ecessors, never gained autonomy over the finances or the 
shipment and sale of ore, of the three Germans, he sustained 
working within the convoluted chain of command and was 
not averse to manipulations himself. He would often be late 
when he returned from leave or holiday and in one instance 
he managed to negotiate a pay rise with Wyllie while the 
Marquis was away in London (NRS, GD112/18/8/14/22 
and GD112/18/8/16/32).
Much of Thost’s activity was focused on the Marquis’ 
peripheral mining ventures: the operations at Tomnadashan, 
proving the recent discovery of a vein of lead ore at 
Ardtalnaig on south Loch Tayside, and the discovery of 
a small nugget of native gold at Lochearnhead (NRS, 
GD112/18/8/16/1). His initial thoughts on Tyndrum con-
cerned establishing ‘profitable methods of working’, get-
ting ‘the minerals from every place’ and ‘preparation with 
water powered machinery’ (NRS, GD112/18/9/7/19). Like 
his predecessors, Thost focused upon improving efficiency 
in the dressing process and in the movement of the ore 
around the site at Tyndrum, and upon increasing labour effi-
ciency. In contrast to Reichendorf and Odernheimer, Thost 
also emphasised safety as well as the wider wellbeing of 
the workforce to improve productivity. He used technologi-
cal adaption to achieve this and, predictably, industrial rela-
tions under his management were generally good.
A prime example of this is his response to the operation 
of the ‘Breadalbane’ incline, originally modified during 
59
Catherine Mills Tyndrum Lead Mine and the German Managers
Odernheimer’s period of management. By 1854 Thost was 
expressing concern that it was too long for ‘waggoning’, 
particularly using hemp rope, and he was concerned that 
there would be an accident on which he comments, this ‘[I] 
dare not pass over with silence’ (NRS, GD112/18/8/14/21). 
Although it was a somewhat backward step, throughout 
1855 ore was once again being transported from the upper 
workings on Minehill to the head of the waggon way by 
pack ponies (NRS, GD112/18/8/16/9). By 1858, Thost had 
solved this particular problem with the use of angular piping 
or troughs filled with water running down the incline. He 
claimed that 12½ cubic feet of water was sufficient to carry 
a total of 4 tons 4 cwt 32 lb of lead ore in 2 inch pieces down 
the incline. Angular troughs, he claimed, can carry anything 
from 2½ inches down to a fine powder at a ‘trifling inclina-
tion’. Although Thost refers to the angular troughs as an 
‘invention’ it is likely this was an adaption of Reichendorf’s 
earlier introduction of wooden canals. Nonetheless, Thost 
presented his ‘invention’ at the Royal Scottish Society of 
the Arts, where he also advocated its use by road trustees 
both for conveying road metal from quarry to depot and for 
street sewers to prevent clogging in the drains (Caledonian 
Mercury, 26 July 1858; also see Easson 2011, 61).
Thost also discovered poor underground conditions, 
described as ‘wretched and dangerous’, due to lack of tim-
bering and attempts to save money on the use of wood (NRS, 
GD112/18/4/1/65). Poor ventilation had also been problem-
atic throughout the mine’s history and was hindering devel-
opment work (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/10). New communica-
tions were cut between levels and Thost also erected a ‘wind 
engine’ in May 1857 to improve the quality of the air via 
a system of pipes and ‘fanners’ (NRS, GD112/18/9/5/10). 
There are no descriptions of the machine, its location or 
its style of construction other than that it was probably 
hand powered. Thost described how ‘three little boys are 
able to satisfy by dividing 16 hours between them’ (NRS, 
GD112/18/9/1/38).
All three Germans preferred a day labour rate to the 
bargain system, but it was Thost who initiated changes to 
encourage work discipline, remove the need for an over-
seer thereby saving more expense, and to help tackle the 
problem of debt that had remained since Crerar’s period of 
management and which, according to Thost, reduced the 
incentive to work. The miners’ wages were eventually cal-
culated by waggon load of ore and a system of rules with 
fines was introduced (NRS, GD112/18/9/27).
Another key example of Thost combining the wider 
well-being of the workforce and technological adaption to 
improve productivity was his addressing the problem of 
water supply at the mine site. The primary dressing floor, 
originally introduced by Odernheimer, was constantly out of 
sequence with the crushing mill at Glengarry. This resulted 
in unprocessed ore stockpiled at the mine and the surface 
workers were laid off at both dressing floors with no pay. 
Thost simply repaired the dam and reconstructed a disused 
leat from the western side of Minehill that was built during 
the Scots Mining Company lease (NRS, GD112/18/8/15/4). 
Much of the revetment and stonewalling of the leat is clearly 
visible at the site today (Figs. 7 and 8).
Thost also persuaded the Marquis to fund his new design 
for ore dressing at the Glengarry mill site. It permitted the 
self-acting reduction of 2½ inch pieces of ore to a fine pow-
der using a series of stepped grates reducing in size, again 
utilising Thost’s right-angled inclined troughs together with 
a corresponding right-angled hoe. He published details of 
his ‘New Arrangements for Cleansing, Sizing, Trunking and 
Buddling Ores at the Tyndrum Mines’ in the Mining Journal 
(copy article with plates at NRS, GD112/18/8/9/4; also see 
Fig. 9 below, based upon Thost’s drawings) and wrote to 
Breadalbane to request that he personally inspect the appa-
ratus and support its patent (NRS, GD112/18/8/16/13). On 
a less grandiose scale, to address the constant repairs to the 
crushing rollers Thost had these cast to a new design so 
that one guided the other and reduced the potential for acci-
dental damage (NRS, GD112/18/8/14/27; also see Fig. 10, 
based on Thost’s drawing).
In July 1860 Thost wrote to the Marquis and made ref-
erence to his ‘particular circumstances’, which prevented 
him from obtaining a passport from ‘any country’; he 
requested that the Marquis support his application to travel 
to France and Switzerland with his wife and two daugh-
ters. Interestingly, Thost was then signing his letter Charles 
Henry Gustav Thost (NRS, GD112/18/1/5/11 and 17). What 
is not clear in the record is whether this trip to the continent 
was permanent, or whether Thost’s services were simply 
being dispensed with, and why. The Marquis had entered 
into negotiations with George Henwood early in 1860 for 
a survey of all mines, including Tyndrum, and Thost disap-
Fig. 7 Route of leat Fig. 8 Leat wall
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pears from the record in 1860. There is no trace of him or 
his family in the 1861 Census.
Economic resilience
To what extent did the managers’ technological adaptions 
of the existing infrastructure and machinery increase effi-
ciency and prolong the working life of the mine? Production 
figures, although sparse, indicate that the amount of ore 
extracted and metal produced increased during Thost’s 
period of management. Production rose from 60 tons 
of ore and 43.8 tons of metal in 1850 to 130 tons and 94 
tons respectively in 1856 (Burt, Waite & Atkinson 1981, 
156). In terms of increased output Thost’s adaptions were 
a success, albeit a short-lived one. However, if the price 
of Tyndrum ore sold at Holywell is considered, it reveals a 
very different picture: the ore only ever received the lowest 
amount, which prompted Thost to consider stockpiling the 
poor quality ore and selling only the richer stuff to ensure a 
better price (Easson 2011, 61 and NRS, GD112/18/9/8/11). 
Income during the period 1850 to 1856 was roughly £2,500, 
which was a marked improvement on the zero amounts 
recorded during the preceding four years, but expendi-
ture for the same period amounted to just under £11,000 
(Robertson 1992, 189–217, 192). Given the financial losses 
under Odernheimer’s management, his decision not to wait 
for a share in the profits that were due for his third year 
of employment was arguably prudent. Production began 
an overall slow trend of decline from 1856 onwards (see 
Table 2) but mining did not cease until 1865, some three 
years after the death of the Marquis and the Breadalbane 
estate executors called a halt to all mining activity (Wilson 
1921, 95).
Although what was an ailing and exhausted mine from the 
outset of the Marquis’ tenure continued to work for almost 
thirty years, technological adaption had not extended its 
economic viability and substantial amounts of money were 
wasted in what Firsoff described as a ‘brave attempt to carry 
on [mining] at a loss’ (Firsoff 1954, 133).
The mine essentially operated to bolster the over-opti-
mistic ideas of the Marquis and to keep the estate tenants in 
employment. Reichendorf noted at the end of his resignation 
letter that the Marquis kept ‘an emu and deer and pheasants 
Fig. 9 Cleansing and sizing apparatus: sketch of Thost’s original plates. (NRS, GD112/18/8/9/4). Detail, top right, is a conjectural recon-
struction, based on Thost 1860, of the right-angled inclined trough and triangular hoe, used in the apparatus.
Fig. 10 Crushing rollers: sketch of Thorst’s original drawing 
(NRS GD112/18/8/14/27)
Table 2 Production
Year Lead ore (tons) Metal (tons) Silver (ounces)
1857 61 42.5 93
1858 54 37 160
1859 69 40 160
1860 80 57.2 229
1861 60 43 172
1862 67 47.5 120
1863 46 32 64
1864 no data
1865 49 35 0
(Data from Mineral Statistics, cited in Burt, Waite & Atkinson 
1981, 156)
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and a museum and other remarkable things’ for his pleasure 
and ‘not for any use’. Reichendorf went on to state that he 
was of the opinion that, in the same way, the Marquis had 
‘a mining officer, miners, a mine, a railway, a crushing mill 
all in the greater glory of the Lord’, suggesting the mine 
was little more than a ‘show piece’ as opposed to a viable 
economic operation. His comments, however, do not accord 
with Thost’s succeeding management of the venture from 
1849 onwards and his optimistic outlook when he claimed 
to have taken ‘the mine onto a new and better road’ and 
wrote that he was hopeful of ‘carrying on continuous eco-
nomical and reasonable mining’ (NRS, GD112/18/8/9/44). 
George Henwood commented that the mine was run for ‘the 
employment of the poor of Clifton village’ (Henwood 1860, 
715), Clifton, now subsumed into Tyndrum, having been 
the name given to the original row of miners’ cottages built 
in the 1730s. Henwood too had a somewhat difficult rela-
tionship with the Marquis. For example, he became increas-
ingly frustrated with the lack of response to his letters and 
the Marquis’ failure to confirm the terms of his employment. 
He did, however, eventually survey the mineral workings 
within the Breadalbane estate (NRS, GD112/18/8/15/30 
and 35; GD112/18/1/5/5).
The difficult and often complex relationships that all the 
external managers had with the Marquis make assessment 
of the validity of their comments difficult. Reichendorf had 
essentially reneged on his contract of employment and was 
unlikely to portray the mine in a good light. It is unclear 
whether Odernheimer and Thost colluded with the over-
optimistic ideas of the Marquis. Thost certainly had a vested 
interest in pandering to his hopes and dreams; he was a refu-
gee in Scotland and reliant on the favours of his employer.
Although there is no direct evidence in the record to 
suggest that estate employment was a primary aim of the 
Marquis, he never wavered in his belief in the great mineral 
wealth of his land. There is, however, the question of pater-
nalistic relationships and public duty; whether by default 
or design, the mine did support local employment. This is 
clearly seen in the case of the Strontian men brought in by 
Baron. The strategy engineered between Wyllie and the 
Marquis was to ensure that the mine would become inde-
pendent of outside labour: the Strontian miners would be 
used to train the young men of Tyndrum and the surround-
ing settlements in mining skills and then they would be 
removed (NRS, GD112/18/8/7/2). A local workforce was 
eventually achieved. For example, throughout the 1850s, 
excepting a handful of men at Tomnadashan and James 
Crerar, the lists of miners employed all reveal local estate 
names (see, for example, NRS, GD112/18/9/8/15).
What is quite interesting is the Germans’ failure to 
explore the potential for adapting processing technology 
to work the zinc blende and the other gangue ores which 
could potentially have prolonged the economic viability of 
the venture. Shortly before his departure Thost began to 
sort and stockpile blende rather than dumping it as waste 
(NRS, GD112/18/8/15/). Yet even the Tyndrum Lead and 
Zinc Company, who worked the mineral lease from 1916, 
failed to realise a profit from both zinc and lead ores. This 
was despite the introduction of modern crushing and sep-
aration technology. It prompted old Tyndrum miner John 
Macfarlene to comment that the Company had made so 
much money abroad that they would not mind operating at a 
loss (Firsoff 1954, 133). Neither small adaptions of existing 
technology nor the introduction of new technology could 
overcome the poor and declining quality of the lead ore.
Conclusion
The majority of the studies in this volume examine key 
developments in mineral extraction and exploration, such 
as mechanical cutting, drainage and boring. In contrast, this 
study has explored technological change on a much smaller 
scale: the adaption and modification of existing infrastruc-
ture and technology and its role in increasing productivity 
and sustaining the economic viability of extracting a finite 
resource.
The survival of substantial documentary evidence for the 
surface operations at Tyndrum mine permitted a focused 
case study approach. The study reveals an intriguing history 
of mismanagement, personality clashes and potential cor-
ruption; in many ways the story was ideal for an assessment 
of the efficacy of adaptive technological strategies. The nine-
teenth century history of the enterprise is one of hasty and 
ill-considered extensive capital investment in a mine with 
complex mineralisation that was nearing exhaustion, based 
on the landowner’s grandiose belief in the mineral wealth 
of both the operation and his landed estate. Reichendorf cut 
his losses and reneged on his contract of employment, but 
Odernheimer and Thost both had a vested interest in realis-
ing a profit: Odernheimer in terms of salary, although he 
cut his losses, and Thost in terms of his refugee status. All 
three Germans tackled the movement of ore around the site 
and the dual problem of a dwindling supply of quality ore 
and complex mineralisation by making small adaptions and 
modifications to the existing arrangements. Henwood sug-
gests that there was no continuity between managers but 
he was referring specifically to underground development 
work at Tyndrum; at the surface each engineer expanded 
and developed the work of his predecessor. In theory their 
modifications should have reduced operating costs and 
increased the opportunity to achieve the ideal concentra-
tion of ore for smelting, at roughly 60–70 %; they should 
ultimately have increased the profitability of the operation 
(Burt 1983, 1–10). Only Thost managed to increase the pro-
duction of dressed ore, albeit very briefly, but the poor qual-
ity of the ore was reflected in the price. Even in a good year 
expenditure always exceeded income. It was the Campbell 
family fortune and the Marquis’ faith and conviction, rather 
than technology, that allowed the venture to continue oper-
ating. Although it was not what the Marquis desired, or 
perhaps even perceived, nonetheless the end result was, as 
Henwood suggested, a charitable public works.
What the study does highlight is the success of techno-
logical adaption in meeting local conditions. The German 
engineers were responding to a very specific set of circum-
stances, both geological and practical, and also the unique 
situation created by their employer’s desire for rich mineral 
deposits and great mineral wealth. They were essentially 
caught in a cleft stick so they simply applied their cumula-
tive knowledge and experience of the mining arts to over-
come the practical difficulties while neither challenging 
nor supporting the erroneous beliefs of the Marquis. This 
application of practical skill supports Burt’s original argu-
ment, discussed in the opening section, that technological 
change occurs where necessary and without formal diffu-
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sion mechanisms (Burt 1991, 249–271, 254). Ultimately, 
for the German engineers, the difficulties at Tyndrum mine 
could not be solved. The venture was exhausted of viable 
lead ore and worked beyond its economic viability.
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